John F. Lange:
In Defense of Ethical Naturalism
An examination of certain aspects of the Naturalistic Fallacy, with particular attention to the logic of the Open Question Argument
January 1963
Presented to the Department of Philosophy of Princeton University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Contents
I. Introduction
II. The Naturalistic Fallacy: Initial Considerations
1. The Indefinability of Good
2. Consolidating Versions of the Naturalistic Fallacy
3. The Naturalistic Fallacy and David Hume
4. The Naturalistic Fallacy: The Search for a Formulation
II. The Analyzability of Good, Treated as Material Issue
5. G.E. Moore's Open Question Argument
6. Naturalistic Rebuttal: Ralph Barton Perry
7. Naturalistic Rebuttal: Paul W. Kurtz
IV. The Analyzability of Good, Treated as Linguistic Issue
8. Nominal and Real Definition
9. Contextual Synonymy and NL-synonymy
10. R.M. Hare's Reservations Concerning the Open Question
11. R.M. Hare's Reformulation of the Open Question
12. Considerations on Ethical Naturalism
Abstract
A re-examination of Ethical Naturalism is in order. This paper is a contribution to such a re-examination. It claims to prove that the most significant objection raised against the feasibility of Ethical Naturalism is not conclusive. It considers the Naturalistic Fallacy, and, in particular, the logic of Open Question Arguments. The mechanics of the paper include proposed explications of important terms and the construction of simplified models for logical analysis.
The substance of the first section of the paper is to review certain issues connected with "indefinability" and to consolidate various versions of the Naturalistic Fallacy. Derivationist and Analyzability Versions are proposed, the former connected with the derivation of normative conclusions from non-normative premise-sets, and teh latter connected with the analysis of good, construed variously as a property, notion, or linguistic entity. Normative conclusions may be derived from non-normative premise-sets, but this is seen as largely irrelevant to the ethical issues involved. More importantly, Derivationist Versions might be understood to depend, in non-trivial forms, on community-accepted descriptive-normative conditionals, which might be considered E-rules, on the analogy of Carnap's proposals for a scientific language. However, Derivationist Versions may be regarded, in certain forms, as depending on Analyzability Versions, which are taken to be the basic subject for analysis.
In the second portion of the paper, the definability of good is treated, as it has traditionally been, as a material issue. G.E. Moore's Open Question Argument is presented, simplified, and examined. Attention is also devoted to refuting attacks on Morre by certain naturalists. Treating the definability of good as a material matter leads to ethical stalemate, no acceptable means being available for resolving the issue of its nature.
In the third portion of the paper, the analyzability of good is treated as a linguistic issue. The nature of definition is considered in so far as it seems relevant to the enterprise of the Ethical Naturalist. Explications of contextual synonymy and of synonymy within a natural language are proposed, in order to provide a structure within which the program of Ethical Naturalism might proceed. R.M. Hare's objection to Moore is examined, and Hare's influential reformulation of the Open Question Argument, within a matrix of non-Moorean assumptions, is considered and criticized. The paper concludes with remarks suggesting the feasibility of Ethical Naturalism.